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Abstract
We propose a statistical model to assess whether individuals strategically use mixed
strategies in repeated games. We formulate a hidden Markov model in which the latent
state space contains both pure and mixed strategies, and allows switching between these
states. We apply the model to data from an experiment in which human subjects
repeatedly play a normal form game against a computer that always follows its part of
the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium profile. Estimated results show significant
mixed strategy play and non-stationary dynamics. We also explore the ability of the
model to forecast action choice.
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1 Introduction
Game theory and the Nash equilibrium solution concept are a key framework in the social
sciences for modeling interactive behavior. The formulation of a normal form game consists
of a set of players, a set of possible actions for each player, and a payoff function for each
player that gives a real-valued payoff for any possible joint action profile – a list of actions
consisting of one for each player. A Nash equilibrium is a joint action profile such that each
player’s assigned action results in at least as high a payoff to the player as any other possible
action, assuming all other players choose their respective actions in the Nash equilibrium
profile. If players are restricted to deterministically choose an action, then there are many
games that don’t have a Nash equilibrium, such as the childhood game of Rock, Scissors,
Paper. Confronted with this problem, Von Neumann (1928) generalized a player’s decision
from choosing an action to choosing a probability distribution over his possible actions.1 This
choice of a probability distribution is called a “mixed” strategy, and a degenerate mixed
strategy which chooses a particular action with probability one is called a “pure” strategy.
The introduction of mixed strategies allows for existence of equilibrium across a broad class
of games: from minimax solutions for zero-sum games (Von Neumann, 1928; Von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944) to noncooperative equilibria for n-person games (Nash, 1951). While
the role of mixed strategies in defining logically consistent solution concepts is not in doubt,
the positive aspect of individuals actually playing mixed strategies is an open question of
considerable interest.
Researchers’ efforts to answer this question have naturally focused on settings where the use
of mixed strategies is most compelling: the repeated play of games which have a unique mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium. The value of “being unpredictable” is readily seen in examples
such as serves in tennis, “bluffing” in poker, and whether or not a tax authority audits a tax
payer. A common approach in this literature is to test whether the players’ action choices are
consistent with the mixed strategy equilibrium. Some studies using controlled experiments
with human subjects have the advantage of knowing the payoff functions, and test whether
choice frequencies agree with the equilibrium strategies and whether players’ sequences of
actions are serially independent (O’Neill, 1987; Binmore, Swierzbinski, and Proulx, 2001;
Morgan and Sefton, 2002; Selten and Chmura, 2008). Other studies consider high-level sports
competitions, such as soccer (Chiappori, Levitt, and Groseclose, 2002; Palacios-Huerta, 2003;
Bareli, Azar, Ritov, Keidarlevin, and Schein, 2007) and tennis (Walker and Wooders, 2001),
with the advantage of studying highly experienced players competing for high stakes and
1Along with generalizing the set of feasible actions to the set of mixed strategies, a player’s payoff function
is extended by setting its value to the expected payoff given a profile of mixed strategies, commonly referred
to as the expected utility property.
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the disadvantage of unknown payoff functions.2 These studies focus on testing the serial
independence of action choice and the equilibrium implication of equal payoffs across action
choices. Some of the most prominent and recurring results for both types of studies are
that aggregated action frequencies across players agree with the equilibrium mixed strategies
but individual action frequencies do not, and for many individuals action choices are serially
correlated violating the independence prediction.
To reconcile these issues of serial correlation and heterogeneity, several studies (Ochs, 1995;
Bloomfield, 1994; Shachat, 2002; Noussair and Willinger, 2011) conduct laboratory experi-
ments using the same type of games but directly elicit mixed strategies by obligating players
to select a probability distribution over actions.3 Elicited strategies in these experiments ex-
hibit various distinct patterns. Some subjects choose pure strategies almost exclusively, some
choose strictly mixed strategies almost exclusively, and others use both types of strategies –
usually in long sequences. Also, certain mixed strategies are often quite focal, such as choosing
equal probability weight on a subset of actions rather than the Nash equilibrium proportions.
Naive interpretation of these results suggests a clear distinction between play that is purposely
unpredictable and play that is a pure best response to changing forecasts of an opponent’s
action (Nyarko and Schotter, 2002). A more cautious interpretation is that subjects may es-
chew the randomizing device provided by the experimenter and instead internally randomize,
or perhaps subjects choose strictly mixed strategies due to the experimenter effect of the novel
elicitation method. Clearly a less invasive method to detect mixed strategy play would be
valuable.
In this study we propose a hidden Markov model (HMM) to detect whether observed action
choices are the result of pure or mixed strategies play in repeated two-person finite action
games.4 There are three key ideas in our formulation: (1) we treat the strategy a player follows
as a latent state and the action played as the observable output from the latent strategy; (2)
the set of possible latent states is a discrete subset of all possible mixed strategies containing
pure strategies, Nash equilibrium or minimax strategies, and focal mixed strategies; and (3)
a player switches the latent strategy he follows according to a first order Markov process.
We then demonstrate the ability of the model by applying it to a new experimental data set
we collect. In our experiment, each human subject repeatedly plays a 2 × 2 game against
a computer player that follows its mixed strategy equilibrium. Some subjects play a zero-
2The action sets are typically comprised of simple actions, e.g., {serve left, serve right} and {defend left,
defend right}. The payoffs are assumed to be the probability of winning the task and these probabilities will
differ based upon both the comparative skills between players and the relative strengths a player has for each
action.
3For example, Shachat (2002) adopts a game with four actions, each identified by a different color, for each
player. Each player must fill a box with 100 cards in any combination of the four colored card types, and then
one card is selected at random to determine the action played.
4See Rabiner (1989) for a classic introduction to hidden Markov models.
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sum game and others an unprofitable game.5 The estimated HMMs reveal several interesting
results, including: (1) significant amounts of both pure and mixed strategy play; (2) the focal
equiprobable mixed strategy is played more often than the Nash equilibrium strategy; (3) low
transition probabilities between mixed and pure latent strategies; (4) dynamic adjustments
in the types of strategies players follow over time; and (5) appreciable rates of both mixed
and pure strategy play in the limiting distributions of the HMMs (interpreted as the long run
equilibrium of play). We then extend the HMM from a statistical framework for evaluating
hypotheses to one for forecasting action choice and assess its predictive accuracy.
2 A HMM of switching strategies
Consider an experiment in which we observe M pairs of subjects, each playing T periods of the
same 2×2 normal form game. Often games like this are described by a two-by-two table, and
for familiarity purposes we denote one subject’s player role as Row and the other as Column.
We label each player role’s two possible actions Left (L) and Right (R), and express a subject’s
mixed strategy as the probability of playing L. Of particular interest is when the game has a
single Nash equilibrium and it is in strictly mixed strategies, although our framework is not
restricted to study only such cases. Three factors confounding the analysis data generated by
this type of process are the latency of players’ mixed strategies, the heterogeneity of strategy
adoption across subjects, and variation of adopted latent strategies over the course of repeated
play. In this section, we present a model that accommodates and allows estimation of these
confounds.
Consider the following HMM for a fixed player role. The state space S is an n-element
subset of the subject i’s possible mixed strategies. Denote si,t ∈ S for the strategy used by
subject i in period t, Si is the set of all possible T element sequences of mixed strategies for
i with typical element si, and let s be the collection of si for all M subjects in a given player
role. Let yi,t denote subject i’s realized action in period t, yi is the corresponding T element
sequence of i’s observable actions, and y is the collection of yi for all M subjects. View {y, s}
as the output of the HMM.
The probability structure of the HMM has three elements. First, the n-element vector
B for which the element Bj is the probability a subject chooses action Left, i.e. the mixed
strategy, if he is in state j. We will provide two analyses which differ in how we specify B. In
one approach we consider B as known a priori, and S and B are redundant notation. Usually,
in this approach, B contains the two pure strategies, other strategies suggested by theory such
5An unprofitable game is one in which the minimax and Nash equilibrium solutions are distinct but yield
the same expected payoff for each player.
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as Nash equilibrium or minimax, and other focal strategies. In the second approach we treat
the elements of B as unknown parameters – the state dependent mixed strategies. The second
element of the structure, pi, is the initial multinomial probability distribution over S. The
third element, P , is the n×n transition probability matrix. The element Pjk is the probability
a subject adopts strategy k in period t conditional upon having adopted strategy j in period
t− 1.
The likelihood function of (B, pi, P ) is
L(B, pi, P |y, s) = Pr(y, s|B, pi, P ).
Rewriting this likelihood in terms of the marginal distributions of y and s gives us
L(B, pi, P |y, s) = Pr(y|s, B, pi, P ) · Pr(s|B, pi, P ).
Next, we assume that the marginal distribution of y conditional on s is independent of pi
and P . In other words, once the state is realized then the probability of a Left action relies
solely on the mixed strategy of the current state. Also, by the specification of the HMM, s is
independent of the state dependent mixed strategies B. This allows us to restate the previous
likelihood function as
L(B, pi, P |y, s) = Pr(y|s, B) · Pr(s|pi, P ).
Since the sequence of states for each subject is unobservable, we evaluate the likelihood by
integrating over the set of all possible sequences
L(B, pi, P |y, s) =
M∏
i=1
∑
s∈S
pi(si,1)B
I〈yi,1〉
si,1
(1−Bsi,1)1−I〈yi,1〉
T∏
t=2
Psi,t−1,si,tB
I〈yi,t〉
si,t
(1−Bsi,t)1−I〈yi,t〉,
where I〈yi,t〉 is an indicator function which equals one for the action Left and zero for the
action Right. As T grows, the number of calculations needed to evaluate this likelihood
quickly becomes computationally impractical. We describe the Bayesian approach we take to
estimate the HMM, although one could proceed down a frequentist path of maximizing the
expected likelihood function using some variation of the EM (expected maximum likelihood)
algorithm.
In the Bayesian analysis, we first factor the joint posterior distribution of the unknown
HMM parameters and unobserved states s into the product of marginal conditional posterior
distributions. Then we evaluate these marginal conditional posteriors through an iterative
sampling procedure called the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method. MCMC is a
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simple but powerful procedure in which the empirical distributions of the sampled parameters
converge to the true posterior distributions. After convergence, iterative sampling is continued
to construct empirical density functions. These are used to make inferences regarding the
parameters of the hidden Markov models.
Consider the posterior density function on the realized unobserved states and HMM pa-
rameters h(s, B, P, pi|y). First, express this joint density as the product of the marginal density
of HMM parameters conditional on the observed action choices and unobserved states with
the marginal density of the states conditional upon action choices
h(s, B, P, pi|y) = h(B,P, pi|s,y)h(s|y).
We have already assumed that the transition matrix P and initial probabilities over states pi
are independent of the action choices and state contingent mixed strategies B, which allows
us to state
h(s, B, P, pi|y) = h(B|s,y)h(P, pi|s,y)h(s|y).
This product of three conditional posteriors permits a simple Markov Chain procedure of
sequentially sampling from these distributions. We start with some initial arbitrary values for
the HMM parameters, (B(l), P (l), pi(l)) where l = 0. We create s(0) by simulation using P (0) and
pi(0) without conditioning on y. From these initial parameter values and the observed action
sequences y, we use a Gibbs sampling algorithm to generate an initial sample of state sequences
s(1). Then we make a random draw P (1) from the posterior distribution of P conditional on
s(1) and y, and proceed similarly to make a random draw of pi(1). We complete the iteration
by making a random draw B(1) from the posterior of B conditional on s(1) and y. The key
to the MCMC method is that as l → ∞, the joint and marginal distributions of B(l), P (l),
and pi(l) converge weakly to the joint and marginal posterior distributions of these parameters
(Geman and Geman, 1987). We now describe the details of each step in an iteration of the
MCMC procedure.
Step 1: Sampling the state sequences s(l)
We begin by describing a Gibbs sampling technique for generating draws from the distribu-
tion of s(l) conditional upon y and (B(l−1), P (l−1), pi(l−1)). The elements of si can be drawn
sequentially for each t conditioning on the observed action choice yi,t, the realized state in
other periods, pi, and P . Let si, 6=t be the vector obtained by removing si,t from the sequence
si. Given si, 6=t, we express the conditional posterior distribution of si,t as
Pr(s
(l)
i,t |yi,t, B(l−1), P (l−1), s(l)i, 6=t, s(l−1)i, 6=t ) ∝ Pr(yi,t|s(l)i,t , B(l−1)) · Pr(s(l)i,t |P (l−1), s(l)i, 6=t, s(l−1)i, 6=t )
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with
Pr(s
(l)
i,t |P (l−1), s(l)i, 6=t, s(l−1)i, 6=t ) = Pr(si,t = k|P (l), s(l)i,t−1, s(l−1)i,t+1 ).
Consequently, the conditional posterior probability of si,t = k and t > 1 is
Pr(s
(l)
i,t = k|·) =
Pr(yi,t|si,t = k,B(l−1)k ) · Pr(si,t = k|P (l−1), s(l)i,t−1, s(l−1)i,t+1 )
n∑
j=1
Pr(yi,t|si,t = j, B(l−1)j ) · Pr(si,t = j|P (l−1), s(l)i,t−1, s(l−1)i,t+1 )
,
and for t = 1
Pr(s
(l)
i,1 = k|·) =
Pr(yi,1|si,1 = k,B(l−1)k ) · Pr(si,1 = k|pi(l−1), s(l−1)i,2 )
n∑
j=1
Pr(yi,1|si,1 = j, B(l−1)j ) · Pr(si,1 = j|pi(l−1), s(l−1)i,2 )
.
The state s
(l)
i,t is determined by making a random draw from the uniform distribution on the
unit interval, and comparing this draw to the calculated conditional probability of s
(l)
i,t .
Step 2: Sampling the transition matrix P (l) and pi(l)
The posterior distributions of Pjk and pi depend only upon s
(l) and the priors. We specify the
prior of pi as a Dirichlet distribution h(pi;α1, . . . , αn) where αj = 1, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Similarly,
we specify the prior of the jth row of P as a Dirichlet distribution h(pj1, . . . , pjn|ηj1, . . . , ηjn).
In an experiment, we record the data from the true start of the HMM process, so we assume
that the joint posterior is simply the product of these two marginal posteriors. The respective
posteriors of pi(l) and P (l) are
h(pi|s) ∝ Pr(s|pi)h(pi;α1, . . . , αn),
and
h(Pj1, . . . , Pjn|s) ∝ Pr(s|Pj1, . . . , Pjn)h(Pj1, . . . , Pjn; ηj1, . . . , ηjn).
If ν0j is the number incidences of s
(l)
i,1 = j in s
(l), and νjk is the count of transitions from
state j to k in s(l), then the conditional probabilities in the two posterior calculations are
multinomial distributions
h(pi|s) ∝ piν011 . . . piν0n−1n−1 ·
(
1−
n−1∑
k=1
pik
)ν0n
h(pi;α1, . . . , αn)
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and
h(Pj1, . . . , Pjn|s) ∝ P νj1j1 . . . P νjn−1jn−1 ·
(
1−
n−1∑
k=1
Pjk
)νjn
h(Pj1, . . . , Pjn; η1, . . . , ηn).
Since the Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate prior for the multinomial distribution, these
posterior distributions are also Dirichlet distributions for which each shape parameter is the
sum of its prior value and the respective count
h(pi|s) = h(pi;α1 + ν01, . . . , αn + ν0n)
and
h(Pj1, . . . , Pjn|s) = h(Pj1, . . . , Pjn; η1 + νj1, . . . , ηn + νjn).
Hence, we select pi(l) and P (l) be taking random draws from these distributions.
Step 3: Sampling the state dependent mixed strategies B
For our initial approach to modeling the state dependent mixed strategies, we assume B
corresponds to a known subset of S. In our Bayesian analysis this is equivalent to assuming a
point prior on these strategies, and therefore there is no updating. So in our Gibbs sampling
procedure we skip this step, and proceed to next iteration of the Gibbs sampler. Of course
this is a rather strong prior to assume, and we should evaluate whether it is appropriate.
Accordingly, we conduct an auxiliary analysis in which we assume a uniform prior of the set
of all mixed strategies.
In the auxiliary analysis we proceed as follows. The priors of state dependent mixed strate-
gies B1, . . . , Bn are assumed independent of each other and of the Markov process governing
the states. Given these assumptions, we can think of each Bj as a Bernoulli probability,
and each Left (Right) action as a success (failure) when occurring in state j. The likelihood
function is calculated as a binomial trial. Since it is the conjugate prior of the binomial, we
assume the prior is a Beta distribution, denoted β(Bj; ζj; γj). We want a uniform prior as
well, and that corresponds to setting the shape parameters ζj and γj to one.
The posterior distribution is simply
h(Bj|y, s(l)) = β(Bj; ζj + κL,j, γj + κR,j),
where κL,j and κR,j are the number of times the actions Left and Right, respectively, are chosen
when in state j according to s(l). The state conditional mixed strategies B
(l)
j , j = 1, . . . , n,
are randomly drawn from these Beta posterior distributions, completing an iteration of the
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Gibbs sampler.
The Gibbs sampler is run for a large number of iterations until the empirical distribution
of all the parameters has converged (Geweke, 1991). Then the sampling procedure is allowed
to continue to run for another number of iterations to build up an empirical distribution that
corresponds to the posterior distribution of the HMM parameters. It is from this empirical
distribution that we conduct statistical inferences.
3 The experiment
We apply our HMM framework to a new experimental data set that provides a likely setting
for mixed strategies, and particulary Nash equilibrium strategies, to be adopted. Additionally,
our procedures allow us to estimate for one player role without the need to also simultaneously
model the opposing role, because each human subject repeatedly plays against a computer
player that follows its mixed strategy equilibrium. Each subject is informed that his opponent
is a computer but is given no information regarding the computer’s strategy. We adopt two
different games in our experimental design, with each subject playing only one of the two
games. One game is zero-sum and the other game is unprofitable.
3.1 The games
Our first game is a zero-sum asymmetric matching pennies game introduced by Rosenthal,
Shachat, and Walker (2003). The normal form representation of this game is presented on
the left side of Figure 1. The game is called Pursue-Evade because the Row player “captures”
points from the Column player when the actions of the two players match, and the Column
player “evades” a loss when the players’ actions differ. In the game each player can move
either Left or Right, and the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in which each player
chooses Left with probability two-thirds. In equilibrium, Row’s expected payoff is two-thirds,
and correspondingly Column’s expected payoff is negative two-thirds.
Our second game is an unprofitable game introduced by Shachat and Swarthout (2004)
called Gamble-Safe. Each player has a Gamble action (Left for each player) which yields a
payoff of either two or zero, and a Safe action (Right for each player) which guarantees a
payoff of one. The normal form representation of this game is presented on the right side of
Figure 1. The Gamble-Safe game has a unique Nash equilibrium in which each player chooses
the Left action with probability one-half, and each player earns an expected equilibrium
payoff of one. Right is the minimax strategy for both players with a guaranteed payoff of
one. Aumann (1985) argues that the Nash equilibrium prediction is not plausible in such an
unprofitable game because its adoption assumes unnecessary risk to achieve the corresponding
9
Pursue-Evade Game Gamble-Safe Game
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Right 1 , 2 1 , 1 
 
Figure 1: The experimental games
Nash equilibrium payoff. For example, imagine Row has Nash equilibrium beliefs and best
responds by playing the Nash strategy. Row’s expected payoff is one. However, suppose
Column instead adopts his minimax strategy Right. This reduces Row’s expected payoff to
one-half. Row could avoid this risk by simply playing the minimax strategy. This aspect
makes the Gamble-Safe game a more challenging test for the hypothesis of mixed strategy
play than the zero-sum Pursue-Evade game.
3.2 Subject recruitment and experiment protocol
We conducted six experiment sessions in the Finance and Economics Experimental Laboratory
(FEEL) at Xiamen University during December 2011. A total of 110 undergraduate and
masters students participated in the experiment, with each session containing between 12 and
22 subjects. 54 subjects were assigned to the Persue-Evade game treatment, and 56 subjects
were assigned to the Gamble-Safe game treatment. Subjects were evenly divided into Row and
Column player roles within each treatment. FEEL uses the ORSEE online recruitment system
for subject recruitment (Greiner, 2004), and at the time of the experiment approximately 1400
students were in the subject pool. A subset of students from the subject pool were invited to
attend each specific session, and these students were informed that they would receive a 10
Yuan show-up payment and have the opportunity to earn more money during the experiment.
Further, the invitation stated that the session would last no more than two hours.
Upon arrival at the laboratory, each subject was seated at a computer workstation such
that no subject could observe another subject’s screen. Subjects first read instructions de-
tailing how to enter decisions and how earnings were determined.6 Then, 200 repetitions of
the game were played. For the Pursue-Evade game, Column subjects were initially endowed
with a balance of 260 tokens each, and Row subjects none. Each token was worth one-third
6The instructions are available at http://www.excen.gsu.edu/swarthout/HMM/
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of a Yuan. Each subject’s total earnings consisted of the 10 Yuan show-up payment plus
the monetary value of his token balance after the 200th repetition. While a mathematical
possibility, no Column subjects in the Pursue-Evade game went bankrupt.
The experiment was conducted with a Java software application created at the Georgia
State University Experimental Economics Center (ExCEN) that allows humans to play normal
form games against computerized algorithms. At the beginning of each repetition, each subject
saw a graphical representation of the game on the screen. Each Column subject’s game display
was transformed so that he appeared to be a Row player. Thus, each subject selected an action
by clicking on a row, and then confirmed his choice. After the repetition was complete, each
subject saw the outcome highlighted on the game display, as well as a text message stating
both players’ actions and his own earnings for that repetition. Finally, each subject’s current
token balance and a history of past play were displayed at all times. The history consisted of
an ordered list with each row displaying the repetition number, the actions selected by both
players, and the subject’s payoff from the specific repetition.
3.3 Data summary
We begin the summary of the experimental data by providing views of the joint distribution
of the proportion of Left play for each subject-computer pair, while conditioning on whether
the data are from the first 100 or last 100 repetitions. Figures 2 and 3 present these views
for the Pursue-Evade and Gamble-Safe treatments, respectively. In each of these figures, the
x-axis is the proportion of Left play for the Column player and the y-axis is the proportion
of Left play for the Row player. Each arrow in the figures represents the play of a single
human-computer pair, with the arrow tail representing the joint frequency of Left play in the
first 100 repetitions and the arrow head representing the joint frequency of Left play in the
final 100 repetitions. These arrows show the adjustments subjects make from the first half to
the second half of play. We see that many arrows suggest substantial change in the human
player frequency, but the changes do not trend in any one direction or uniformly towards
the Nash equilibrium. Human play also displays greater dispersion and displacement from
the Nash equilibrium than the computer opponents, suggesting nonconformity with the Nash
equilibrium predictions.
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of subjects’ frequencies of Left play
by treatment and role. Recall that we have 2700 observations for the each role in the Pursue-
Evade treatment and 2800 observations for each role in the Gamble-Safe treatment. Although
the Row player mean is close to the Nash equilibrium proportion in both game treatments, the
Nash equilibrium proportion is rejected for all four cases at any reasonable level of significance.
In each of the four cases, subjects’ proportions of Left play display too much variance to have
11
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Figure 2: Pursue-Evade joint Left frequencies.
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Figure 3: Gamble-Safe joint Left frequencies.
been generated by a common binomial process. In unreported χ2 tests, we soundly reject this
notion of homogeneity for all cases.
Rejecting the hypothesis of a single mixed strategy for each game and role, we present in
Table 2 summary statistics for individual Pursue-Evade subjects and find evidence of hetero-
geneity and a lack of serial independence in choices. First, we present the number of times
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Table 1: Aggregate Summary Statistics
Statistic P-E Row P-E Col G-S Row G-S Col
Average Left frequency 0.63 0.51 0.48 0.30
Standard deviation Left frequency 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.20
Nash equilibrium z-test statistic −6.54 −25.06 −3.18 −30.20
the Left action is played in the first and second 100 repetitions. A two-tailed binomial test
of the Nash equilibrium at the 95 percent level of confidence gives us critical regions of less
than 58 and more than 76. We reject the Nash proportion of Left play for 13 (12) of the Row
subjects during the initial (final) 100 repetitions, and we reject the Nash proportion for 21
(20) of the Column subjects during the initial (final) 100 repetitions.
Next, we evaluate whether the subjects’ sequences of action choices are serially independent
via a nonparametric runs test. The z-test statistic has a distribution approximate to the
standard normal and is a function of the sequence length R, and the number of Left and
Right sequences, rL and rR, respectively. Its value is
z =
rL + rR − 2rLrRR − 12√(
2rLrR(2rLrR−R)
R2(R−1)
) .
The null hypothesis of the test is that a subject’s choices are independent realizations of a
binomial random variable. We conduct a two-tailed test. Rejections from larger values of
the test statistic indicate too many runs, and are symptomatic of negative serial correlation.
Rejections from smaller values indicate too few runs, and are symptomatic of positive serial
correlation. For the Row players, we reject serial independence for 10 subjects in the first half
of the sample, and only 4 subject in the second half. For the Column players, the number
of rejections is 14 and 10 for the first and second half, respectively. There is a notable bias
with respect to the Column players; 22 out of 24 of the rejections come from z scores that are
too negative and indicate strong positive serial correlation. This is consistent with the results
found by Rosenthal et al. (2003) in the original study of the Pursue-Evade game, but atypical
for other studies which often find negative serial correlation.
Table 3 presents a similar data summary for the individual subjects of the Gamble-Safe
treatment. In this case, the Nash equilibrium mixed strategy is equiprobable, and the critical
regions of the two-sided binomial tests are 39 or less and 60 or more Left action choices. For
the Row players, the Nash hypothesis is rejected for 16 subjects in the first 100 repetitions
and 15 in the second 100 repetitions. Correspondingly for the Column players, the Nash
hypothesis is rejected for 25 subjects in the first half of repetitions and 21 players in the
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Table 2: Pursue-Evade individual subject summary data.
Row Player Column Player
Rounds 1-100 Rounds 101-200 Rounds 1-100 Rounds 101-200
Left Runs Left Runs Left Runs Left Runs
Pair Count Stat Count Stat Count Stat Count Stat
1 77n,e −2.40i 71e 0.20 59n −4.44i 45n −3.35i
2 67e 1.32 66e −0.20 50n 6.23i 53n 3.47i
3 77n,e −0.12 85e −0.60 51n 1.01 71e 0.69
4 49n −1.60 65n,e −1.22 22n,e −2.45i 13n,e −2.08i
5 59 1.17 63e −0.35 56n −1.28 44n −0.26
6 39n,e 0.93 37n,e 1.81 53n 1.85 40n 1.47
7 62e 1.04 68e −0.58 41n −0.49 76e −2.35i
8 47n 0.44 48n −0.19 54n −3.58i 52n 0.22
9 51n −4.82i 84n,e 1.18 63n,e −1.64 76e −2.35i
10 65e −4.53i 55n −1.73 39n,e −3.08i 29n,e −3.96i
11 48n 2.63i 55n −1.12 46n −2.16i 31n,e 1.70
12 63e −2.29i 75e 0.94 54n −2.57i 54n −3.78i
13 60 −1.26 59 0.96 61e 0.72 48n −1.39
14 64e −1.11 73e −0.36 54n −2.16i 37n,e −1.64
15 78n,e 0.79 66e −1.09 45n −3.76i 41n −5.90i
16 68e 2.19i 88n,e 1.39 50n −2.01i 54n −1.55
17 70e 0.72 73e −1.64 50n −2.61i 20n,e −3.16i
18 46n −2.16i 40n −2.51i 70e −0.72 52n −1.39
19 51n 2.02i 65e 1.00 41n −0.08 22n,e 0.49
20 80n,e 2.21i 78n,e −0.09 45n −3.15i 25n,e −6.86i
21 51n 0.61 64e −0.45 50n 0.40 62e 1.47
22 68e −0.12 84n,e −0.33 70e −1.68 47n 0.64
23 64e −0.24 60 2.09i 58 −1.39 78n,e −1.86
24 64e 0.42 64e −0.24 58 1.71 66e −1.54
25 42n −0.97 43n −2.67i 87n,e −2.98i 100n,e — z
26 76e 0.42 57n −0.82 62e 1.04 59 1.58
27 45n −6.19i 75e −2.55i 41n −2.57i 27n,e −1.90
n Two-sided binomial test rejection of the NE proportion of 2/3 at the 5% level of significance.
e Two-sided binomial test rejection of equiprobable proportion at the 5% level of significance.
i Runs test rejection of serial independence at the 5% level of significance.
z Missing values due to inapplicability of test on data with zero variation.
second half of repetitions. Also, we see that 9 Column player subjects almost exclusively play
the pure minimax strategy (over 90 times) in the last 100 repetitions, while there is only one
such Row player. Further, we find evidence of serial correlation in many individuals’ choice
sequences. For the Row players, we reject serial independence for 12 and 9 subjects in the first
and last 100 repetitions, respectively. For the Column players, serial independence is rejected
for 12 subjects in the first half of repetitions and 5 subjects in the second half of repetitions.
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Table 3: Gamble-Safe individual subject summary data.
Row Player Column Player
Rounds 1-100 Rounds 101-200 Rounds 1-100 Rounds 101-200
Left Runs Left Runs Left Runs Left Runs
Pair Count Stat Count Stat Count Stat Count Stat
1 43 0.61 39m 3.26 24m −2.07i 14m −0.88
2 43 −3.29i 51 1.21 19m −0.91 12m 0.42
3 60m −0.63 56 −1.08 36m −3.29i 44 −5.36i
4 40 −1.05 44 −0.06 3m −1.54 0m — z
5 72m 0.17 76m 0.97 26m 0.66 31m 2.41i
6 50 −1.81 41m −2.57i 70m −4.80i 59 −0.49
7 41 0.13 63m −1.43 15m 1.39 9m −0.24
8 60m −3.77i 56 −2.50i 63m −1.86 65m −0.77
9 16m −2.22i 26m −6.41i 33m −2.78i 19m −3.54i
10 39m −0.12 77m −3.25i 36m −1.33 29m −1.27
11 72m 3.42i 76m −1.24 62m −1.73 52 1.02
12 64m 3.48i 53 4.27i 24m 0.70 24m −0.69
13 33m −3.46i 15m −2.59i 41 −1.33 19m 1.06
14 32m −0.81 44 2.19i 51 −4.42i 49 −0.20
15 56 −1.89 44 −0.47 14m 1.23 8m 0.90
16 44 0.96 41 0.13 11m 0.22 9m 1.02
17 41 1.17 50 1.81 73m −2.15i 59 −0.08
18 35m −4.75i 4m −6.50i 34m −0.87 8m 0.90
19 31m −0.89 28m −1.58 54 2.09i 62m 0.83
20 56 −2.10i 38m −0.67 4m −2.33i 2m 0.24
21 68m −0.35 59 0.96 8m −3.30i 4m 0.44
22 46 −2.77i 37m −1.64 2m 0.24 0m — z
23 20m −2.21i 20m −0.32 20m 0.00 32m −1.28
24 69m 0.05 59 −0.70 12m 0.42 32m 1.04
25 46 −0.74 49 1.01 65m −2.10i 40 −2.51i
26 68m 2.42i 63m 0.30 39m −0.12 31m −1.60
27 80m −4.74i 24m −2.62i 38m −2.37i 44 −1.49
28 63m −0.13 60m 0.21 30m −2.64i 6m −3.03i
m Two-sided binomial test rejection of equiprobable proportion at the 5% level.
i Runs test rejection of serial independence at the 5% level of significance.
z Missing values due to inapplicability of test on data with zero variation.
4 Results of the HMM statistical analysis
In this section we present the estimated HMMs for the Pursue-Evade and Gamble-Safe treat-
ments. First we report the means and variances of the posterior distributions of the transition
probability matrices and the initial distributions over states. The estimates reflect adoption of
both pure and mixed strategies and characterize the switching between latent strategies. We
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then use these estimates to generate a description of the dynamics of the latent mixed strategy
evolution. Finally, we provide an assessment of the robustness of some of our assumed priors.
4.1 Pursue-Evade game
For the Pursue-Evade game, we restrict the latent state space S to contain four elements. We
treat the corresponding vector of state dependent mixed strategies B as fixed and known, and
the four elements are the pure Right strategy (PR), the focal equiprobable mixed strategy
(EM), the Nash equilibrium strategy (NE) of two-thirds, and the pure Left strategy (PL).
Specifically, we assume a point prior of B = (0, 0.5, 0.67, 1). Using this point prior we estimate
the HMM using the MCMC method.
We run the the Gibbs sampler for 10,000 iterations. Using the last 5000 iterations, we
establish that the empirical density functions have converged by applying the Geweke test
(Geweke, 1991). Then we use these last 5000 iterations to make statistical inferences. Table 4
presents the estimated means and standard deviations of the transition probabilities between
states, the same for the initial probabilities over state posteriors, and the calculated limiting
distributions of the Markov chains for both Row and Column.
Table 4: Estimated transition matrices, initial and limiting distributions of Pursue-Evade
game
Row Player Column Player
PRt+1 EMt+1 NEt+1 PLt+1 PRt+1 EMt+1 NEt+1 PLt+1
PRt
0.75 0.145 0.051 0.054 0.752 0.204 0.025 0.018
(0.038) (0.037) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029) (0.03) (0.015) (0.01)
EMt
0.025 0.95 0.013 0.013 0.095 0.879 0.019 0.007
(0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.028) (0.033) (0.012) (0.005)
NEt
0.005 0.007 0.939 0.05 0.012 0.021 0.96 0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.022) (0.005)
PLt
0.022 0.023 0.218 0.737 0.039 0.034 0.031 0.896
(0.011) (0.011) (0.035) (0.034) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.026)
pi
0.082 0.614 0.193 0.111 0.043 0.161 0.735 0.061
(0.063) (0.13) (0.12) (0.08) (0.040) (0.127) (0.141) (0.057)
Limiting
0.050 0.274 0.548 0.128 0.178 0.385 0.356 0.080
Distribution
Note: standard deviations are in parentheses.
Our estimation of the initial distribution over states is presented in the the fifth numeric
row of Table 4. For both roles we find initial play has a high rate of mixed strategy play.
Row players predominately follow the EM (61%), while the Column players predominantly
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follow the NE (74%). Interestingly, this is quite different from the limiting distribution of
the estimated transition matrices, which we can interpret as the long run steady state of the
HMM. For the Row player, the mode of the limiting distribution is the NE (55%), while for
the Column player both EM and NE are roughly equally likely, with probabilities of 39%
and 36%, respectively. Clearly there is movement of strategy adoption over time.
Some aspects of these dynamics can be seen by inspection of the estimated transition prob-
abilities, given in the first four numeric rows of Table 4. Large values on the main diagonals
and corresponding small values on the off-diagonals indicate strong inertia in adopting new
strategies. There are some interesting patterns when there is a transition between strategies.
Consider the Row players first. When switching away from PR a player is almost three times
as likely to switch to EM than either of the other two strategies. Likewise, when switching
away from EM a player is twice as likely to switch to PR than either of the other strate-
gies. There’s a similar probabilistic cycle between NE and PL with much larger switching
probabilities between them. The dynamic effects of these cycling tendencies can be seen in
Figure 4, which presents time series of the estimated proportion of subjects using each of the
four strategies.7 The PL and the NE series tend to mirror one another, as do the PR and
EM strategies – albeit with more noise.
The results for the Column players in the right hand side of Figure 4 are quite different.
The use of NE steadily declines while the adoption of EM rises in the first 50 repetitions. Fur-
thermore, we see a slow emergence of PR over the course of the experiment. The probabilistic
cycle between the EM and PR strategies is evident by their sharp mirroring pattern.
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Figure 4: Strategy dynamics in Pursue-Evade game
Next we assess the appropriateness of our degenerate prior on B by conducting the MCMC
7For strategy j the estimated proportion of subjects using that strategy in a given round t is jˆt =
1
27·5000
∑10000
l=5001
∑27
i=1 Isli,t=j .
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estimation using a uniform Beta prior, β(Bj; 1, 1), for each of the state dependent mixed
strategies. We then sample from the posterior distributions to construct an empirical density
function for each of the state dependent mixed strategies. In Figure 5 we present kernel
smoothed plots of these approximations to posterior densities. Inspection reveals for the Row
player the posteriors are sharply peaked and closely centered on our assumed four strategies,
except for the NE and the posterior with a mode close to 3/4 instead of 2/3. For the Column
player we see three out of four posteriors coincide with our assumed set. The one difference
is the PR and the posterior with a mode of about 0.15.
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Figure 5: Posterior distribution of B in Pursue-Evade game
4.2 The Gamble-Safe game
We now turn our attention to the Gamble-Safe game. Here, we restrict the latent state space
S to contain three elements. In our estimation we treat B as fixed and consisting of the
elements PR (the minimax strategy), EM (which is also the NE strategy), and PL. We use
the same parameters for the Gibbs Sampler as we used in analyzing the PE data.
For both the Row and Column player data sets we ran the Gibbs Sampler for 10,000
iterations, using the last 5000 iterations for inference after testing for convergence of the
empirical densities with the Geweke test. The posterior means and standard deviations are
reported in Table 5. Comparing the estimated initial distribution pi to the limiting distribution
suggests that an initial high probability of the mixed Nash strategy play reduces over time
for both player roles. The change for the Column player is more dramatic as EM goes from
60% to 40%, and that reduction corresponds to a rise in the minimax strategy PR from 34%
to 53%.
In contrast to the PE game, there is a segregation between mixed strategy and pure
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strategy followers. Evidence of this is found in the estimated Markov transition matrices as
we can see they almost fail to be irreducibile (roughly meaning we can always reach one state
from another, even if it takes multiple transitions). The probability of continuing in the EM
state is nearly one, indicating that once a subject follows the mixed strategy he is likely to do
so for a large number of repetitions. Pure strategy adopters exhibit quite different patterns
depending upon whether they are in the Row or Column role, in particular with respect to
switching tendencies in the PL state. From the PL state, Row players transition to PR with
26% probability, while this transition probability is 79% for Column players.
Table 5: Estimated transition matrices, initial and limiting distributions of Gamble-Safe game
Row Player Column Player
PRt+1 EMt+1 PLt+1 PRt+1 EMt+1 PLt+1
PRt
0.815 0.010 0.175 0.891 0.006 0.103
(0.027) (0.020) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007)
EMt
0.003 0.988 0.009 0.007 0.985 0.008
(0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.008)
PLt
0.260 0.043 0.697 0.791 0.042 0.167
(0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.031) (0.031) (0.044)
pi
0.169 0.779 0.052 0.337 0.596 0.067
(0.084) (0.094) (0.046) (0.098) (0.103) (0.052)
Limiting
0.203 0.660 0.137 0.527 0.404 0.059
Distribution
Note: standard deviations are in parentheses.
Figure 6 presents the time series of the estimated proportion of subjects using each of the
three latent strategies. Here we see the impact of the Markov transition probabilities that
lead to inertia of the mixed strategy state and also the strong cycling tendencies of players
between the Left and Right pure strategies. In the Row player figure, we see the EM strategy
proportion has a smooth path that drops quickly from its initial level to its limiting value
within the first 50 repetitions, after which it remains relatively constant. We also see the
ragged mirroring pattern, indicating switching between the PR and PL strategies. We see
similar features in the Column figure except that the EM shows a more gradual decline,
and PR shows a corresponding gradual increase. This leads to the separation of the PR
and PL strategies and allows us to see the clear short run switching between these strategies
characterized by the jagged mirror relationship between their respective series.
We test the robustness of our point prior B = [0, 0.5, 1], by estimating an HMM for
which these state conditional strategies each have a uniform Beta prior. The kernel smoothed
empirical density functions of the posteriors are presented in Figure 7 for both Row and
19
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Figure 6: Strategy dynamics in Gamble-Safe game
Column players. For the Row player, the lower and middle posteriors are closer together than
our assumed sets. For the Column player, the posteriors of the lower two state dependent
strategies are shifted to the right of our assumed ones. We conjecture these shifts could come
from erroneously assumed homogeneity of the strictly mixed strategy used by subjects. An
alternative would be to increase the number of elements in S or to model the individuals’
strictly mixed strategies coming from a hierarchical process.
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Figure 7: Posterior distribution of B in Gamble-Safe game
4.3 Forecasting realized actions
Until now our primary concern has been the estimation of when subjects adopt pure and
mixed strategies, and our HMM’s function has been to provide a statistical framework to test
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theories about latent strategy choice. Now we explore the potential of the HMM to predict
actions taken; a valuable capability in widespread applications from strategic maneuvers in
military engagements, to knowing when a poker player is bluffing.
We first consider how well the estimated HMMs coincide with the observed proportions of
Left play in our experimental data set. For this forecasting exercise of the experimental panel
data set we calculate, for each game and role, the predicted proportion of Left play by the M
subjects in period t, L̂eftt, by
L̂eftt =
1
M · L
L∑
l=1
M∑
d=1
N∑
j=1
(Isld,t=j)βj.
Here L is the length of sequence of the Gibbs sampler we use for statistical inference. For
our data sets this sequence is iterations 5001 to 10000. Figure 8 presents plots of the time
series of the predicted and actual proportions of Left play. In all four settings the predictions
track the trends in the actual data. Admittedly this is an in-sample forecasting exercise, but
nonetheless still impressive, as minimizing forecast error is not the objective of our statistical
inference exercise.
Out-of-sample forecasting is of more practical use and we can use the HMM for this purpose
as well. We estimate, with 10,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler, the HMM for both point
and uniform Beta priors on B for the first 100 repetitions and use these estimates to make
one-step-ahead forecasts of the last 100 repetitions. Let Ψ = (P, pi,B, si,t)
10000
j=5001 denote the
realized draws of the Gibbs sampler for the last 5000 iterations of the MCMC algorithm that
are used for statistical inference for the uniform Beta prior HMM. The predictive density of
si,t is obtained by simulation from the joint posterior sample Ψ as follows:
sˆ
[j]
i,t ∼ p(si,t|P [j], s˜[j]i,t−1), j = 5001, . . . , 10000. (1)
We can use these sampled states for subject i to generate the following 5000 draws from
the following marginal posterior sample
yˆ
[j]
i,t ∼ p(yi,t|sˆ[j]i,t, B[j]), j = 5001, . . . , 10000. (2)
The average of the 5000 draws made according to Equation 2, denoted yˆi,t, is the prediction of
yi,t. Next we use yi,t to generate the posterior density s˜i,t by Bayes’ Rule. This is substituted
into Equation 1 to start the process of generating the prediction of yi,t+1. To assess the
accuracy of our forecast of the holdout sample, we calculate and report the Log-likehood
21
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Figure 8: Actual and forecasted proportions of Left play
statistic
LL(y|Ψ) =
200∑
t=101
M∑
i=1
ln[I〈yi,t〉p(yˆi,t) + (1− I〈yi,t〉)(1− p(yˆi,t))].
We also report the Akaike information criterion statistic, which is AIC(y, yˆ) = −2 · (LL−
number of model parameters).
In order to evaluate the ability of alternative models to predict the future actions in
games, we compare the performances of one-step-ahead forecasting of the HMMs of point and
uniform Beta priors (UHMM) on B against the alternatives of the Nash equilibrium strategy
and individual-specific mixed strategies (IM) which are estimated by each subject’s proportion
of Left play in the first 100 repetitions.
We summarize the out-of-sample forecasting performance for each of the four models in
Table 6. First, for the Row players in both game treatments the two HMMs outperform the
two other models when we do and do not penalize for the number of parameters. For the
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hold out sample of the Column players and not penalizing for the number of parameters,
the IM model performs comparable to the two HMM models in the Pursue-Evade game,
and the IM model performs comparable to the UHMM model (both of which outperform
the HMM) in the Gamble-Safe game. However, when we penalize for increasing numbers of
parameters we see the UHMM clearly outperforms the IM model. This suggests that our
homogeneous dynamic model performs well on forecasting a population of game players, but
also suggests that allowing for more individual heterogeneity could lead to even better out of
sample forecasting performance.
Table 6: Out of sample forecasting performance
Row Player Column Player
Treatment Statistic NE IM HMM UHMM NE IM HMM UHMM
P-E Game
Loglik −1748 −1736 −1723 −1710 −2058 −1775 −1776 −1771
AIC 3497 3526 3475 3458 4117 3605 3583 3580
G-S Game
Loglik −1941 −1916 −1887 −1865 −1941 −1429 −1517 −1436
AIC 3884 3887 3789 3751 3885 2915 3050 2894
5 Discussion
We have introduced a HMM for the detection of pure and mixed strategy play in repeated
games. We then applied this model to data from a new experiment in which human subjects
repeatedly play against computer opponents that were programmed to play their part of
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We find that subjects do play both pure and mixed
strategies, and switch between these over the course of play. Further, we find there is non-
stationarity in the distribution of latent strategies over time. We observe a large movement
from the initial distribution over strategies to those of the limiting distribution of the HMM.
However, while the limiting distribution assigns probability to the subjects’ NE strategy, the
assigned probability is less than 1. Thus, for our data, we show that a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium is only partially self-enforcing. This is a new result in behavioral game theory, as
previous studies have only considered the composite hypothesis that mixed strategy equilibria
are both self-enforcing and also the limit point of the subjects’ learning process.
Our primary interest has been modeling a population of players interacting in a game with
known payoffs, however there are several natural extensions to our approach. First, we could
focus on the modeling and forecasting of a single subject from the population. To do this,
we likely need to allow more individual heterogeneity in the HMM. A first step would be to
allow each player to have a set of individual-specific strict mixed strategies to follow. This
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could done by allowing individual state dependent mixed strategies Bis, or by modeling these
Bis as coming from a hierarchal structure characterized by a small set of hyperparameters. A
second extension is to model strategic situations in the field, in which the game payoffs are not
known because of unobserved individual heterogeneity. For example, soccer players making
penalty kicks may vary in their strength of kicking left or right, and similarly goalies also may
have unobservable differences in defending kicks to the left and right. In such cases, the HMM
can help identify such payoffs and also describe the players’ learning process regarding these
latent payoff types.
The HMM as presented in this paper is currently more of a statistical description than a
behavioral model derived from optimizing behavior. To become such a behavioral model, the
transition probabilities must become an endogenous function of a player’s expected payoffs for
the differing latent strategy choices. One possible approach is to allow a player to form beliefs
about an opponent’s action and then best respond. The issue here is that in an expected utility
world a mixed strategy is never a strict best response. However, if one takes the approach
that uncertainty about an opponent’s action is ambiguous – i.e., a player doesn’t have the
ability to form a unique prior – then an ambiguity-averse player may strictly prefer a mixed
strategy over pure strategies.
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